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$EVWUDFW
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between technical 
standardization and innovation in the ICT-sector. In many ways, this exercise 
involves revisiting the themes or sub-themes of much work already done in this 
growing area. In others, it involves linking the dominantly economics standards-
oriented literature with systems–oriented innovation-studies and other cross-
disciplinary approaches. Our objective here is to review some of this literature 
and, hopefully, provide a synthesis that advances our appreciation of 
standardization’s role in the innovation process. This is an important exercise as 
a sure-footed understanding of the fundamental relationship allows one to 
appreciate the effects and implications of the standardization process within the 
changing environment, especially, implications for user-participation.  
 
Support for the project comes from the Norwegian Research Council, SKIKT 
Program (project 147537/510)  
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5DLVLQJ6WDQGDUGV,QQRYDWLRQDQGWKHHPHUJLQJ
JOREDOVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQHQYLURQPHQWIRU,&7
,QWURGXFWLRQ
In 1928, an early student of industrial standardization observed that, “Until in-
ternational trade is conducted on a basis less strongly flavored with nationalism, 
and industrial education has made more progress than it has yet, there will ap-
parently be little economic justification for extensive standardization.” (Condit, 
1928: 40)1 There is little doubt that, 70 years on, a period of such extensive 
standardization is at hand in the information and communication technology 
(ICT) field. Indeed a new standardization environment is emerging, character-
ized by a proliferation in type and number of voluntary standards organizations 
and in new modes of working and inter-working within and between them. (cf. 
Werle, 2000) We recognize some of the reasons for this development: these in-
clude the liberalization of certain (telecom) markets, the rapid technological 
change of information, communication and broadcasting/media technologies and 
not least the ways these technologies converge.  Although we recognize these 
factors and ingredients and we know in some detail the developments both in 
the procedures and the institutional setting, we cannot claim to know the me-
dium to long-term effects of this emerging standardization environment. A par-
ticular area of concern is how the changing environment will involve a greater 
exclusion or inclusion of relevant interests in the process. Such concerns raise 
the need to evaluate the fundamentals of the standards-process. 
In this paper, we will review some aspects of the changing standardization envi-
ronment before considering the standardization process’ economic justification. 
Then we will look at its role in the innovation process and finally we will con-
sider some of the implications of the changing environment. 
6WDQGDUGVDQGVWDQGDUGVHWWLQJSURFHVVHV
The questions ‘what are ICT standards’2, ‘what is the standards-process’, and, 
even, ‘who is a user’ (cf. Naemura, 1995 and Salter, 1995) of an ICT standard 
are not trivial questions with unambiguous answers. One problem lies in the dif-
ficulty of defining a phenomenon that is changing. In this case, there have been 
manifold shifts involving not only what, where, how, when (i.e. in the technol-
ogy’s life), and by whom formal standards are produced. Another difficulty lies 
in the variegated nature of standards in this changing ICT field. A third lies, not 
least in the contextual diversity of those who attempt to analyze it.  
It is worth beginning with a standard view of standardization as a baseboard for 
further discussion. There are different ways to classify standards and the stan-
dards process. The Office of Technology Assessment (1992) differentiated the 
                                                
1 Cited in OTA, Building Blocks of the Future, 1992: 11. 
2 “Is there some general taxonomic principle which economists might use in distinguish-
ing among the many varieties of 'standards'?” (David,1987) 
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concept of standardization in terms of what they standardize. According to these 
criteria, there are three main kinds of standards: 
1. product standards 
2. control standards 
3. process standards 
 
A second criterion involves how they standardize. Again, there are three kinds:  
1. standards set through the market, on a de facto basis 
2. standards set by government, through the regulatory process 
3. and standards negotiated through a voluntary consensus process. 
 
Here, we are chiefly interested in the last case, that is of standards jointly 
elaborated by diverse actors in voluntary standards development organizations 
(SDOs) like the ITU-T, the ISO/IEC, or ETSI.3 Industry-standards as developed 
by consortia and other forums like ATM Forum, X/open or IETF are also 
increasingly relevant to the new standards-environment. We are especially 
interested in “baseline standards”4 which promote compatibility between 
technologies at a “non-product” level.5  
About the standards-setting process, a preface is also in order. An apt descrip-
tion of the phenomenon we are interested in is that: 
“Standards result from the intricate interaction of company business strategies, standards 
committee activities, government interventions, and processes of market diffusion, and they are 
rooted in the perceived technical requirements for developing, manufacturing, operating or 
using devices that are meant to inter-work with others.” (Schmidt & Werle, 1998. p33)  
In other words, standards-setting brings together commercial, academic and 
regulatory interests who, through complex interaction, identify the need for 
common specifications for a network-based technology and elaborate, develop 
and disseminate technical specifications. Why? What motivates and modulates 
this interaction and what is its relationship to innovation of information and 
communication technologies? Before we address such questions in sections 2 and 
3, it might be helpful to make some general observations about the significance 
of standardization and its changing position.  
During the past decades, formal standards-setting has played a central role in 
the development of information technologies and communication technologies. 
(Wallenstein, 1990) More recently, the production of technical standards has be-
come an important precondition for the convergence of these previously sepa-
rated technological areas. In addition to opening up new technological markets, 
standards are important in providing for growth in geographical markets. Tech-
nical standards are fundamental to cross-border compatibility and interoperabil-
ity of information and communication technologies: in the environment of tele-
                                                
3 See Jakobs, 2000: 2.1. for a discussion of taxonomy. 
4 See Jakobs, 2000: 11. See also “coordinative standards” Schmidt & Werle (1998) and 
discussion below. 
5 See Tassey (2000) and discussion below 
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com re-regulation, these standards are directly associated with continued 
growth of world-trade and co-operation associated with ‘globalization’.  
6WDQGDUGL]DWLRQDQG'HFRQRPLFMXVWLILFDWLRQ“
The economic justification Condit (see above) was looking for is but one of a 
complex set of factors in the perpetuation of today’s globalizing standardization 
environment. It is however obviously central to the voluntary consensus stan-
dards and critical to our understanding of the role standardization plays as an 
institution in the innovation process. In this section, we will review some ways 
to understand the economic rationales for this institution. We will then consider 
some ways the literature has approached it, before analyzing more deeply the 
role it plays in the innovation process. 
The static allocation perspective of the dominant (neo-classical) production the-
ory is not directly helpful in understanding the economic rationale of formal 
standardization. In fundamental ways, standardization is indeed irrelevant to 
the theory. However, the ways in which it is QRW relevant to this theory is in-
structive to understanding its underlying rationale. 
Neo-classical production theory focuses on how economic agents make allocation 
decisions in a state characterized by scarcity of resources, the absence of uncer-
tainty and perfect competition of markets. In this somewhat tired view, rivals 
compete to supply established products at lower prices on saturated markets. 
Firms face a choice of what to produce and how to produce it. Calculations of 
rates of returns based on known factor prices inform the firm’s decision on how 
to (re)allocate capital and labor inputs in order to maximize profits. In an effi-
cient market, the firm can move at negligible costs from production function to 
production function in search of higher profits. 
This view puts a premium on facilitating flexibility both at the firm and at the 
level of the economy as a whole. In the first instance, firm performance is predi-
cated on its ability to adopt new production techniques and enter new markets 
with ease. In the second, the efficiency of the economy depends on promoting en-
try and exit without friction.6 The position of technology in the sense of new 
knowledge, the creation and acquisition of which would seem to be central to the 
ability to compete, is not made explicit is such a model. Technology is instead 
abstracted to the level of information. Information is expected to exist in pub-
licly-shared stocks, more or less equally available to all agents at negligible cost. 
On it, individual agents make rationale decisions based on their individual pref-
erences in perfect competition with other agents. 
The archetypal state taught in this theory is obviously at variance with the ob-
servable state of ICT markets in several essential ways. In general, the theory is 
not very well endowed to deal with the uncertainty of innovation nor does it go 
very far in describing the situation that faces most agents in their markets. 
There are several particular discrepancies between the assumptions of the the-
ory and the reality that are worth highlighting as some of the basic economic 
rationales for the formal standardization of information and communication 
technologies come into relief by doing so. In this context, we want to highlight 
three areas of discrepancy that are relevant to the way formal standardization 
                                                
6 See Gaillard’s(1934), shifts in temporary states of technologies, shifts in temporary 
states of markets: in conclusion. 
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works. These are the assumptions regarding (i.) price as the selection mecha-
nism, (ii.) the relevance and nature of information and (iii.) the nature of goods 
and of agents.  
L3ULFHFRPSHWLWLRQDQGXQFHUWDLQW\
The theory assumes that economic agents compete on price and that it is price-
competition that selects winners. In the ICT field, vendors typically do not com-
pete primarily on price in more or less saturated markets characterized by per-
fect competition. The position of price is not of primary importance as a selection 
mechanism in this context. What ICT-vendors are faced with are globalizing hi-
tech markets with shrinking product life-cycles and resilient levels of demand. 
In this setting, technology is more central to an economic agent’s competitive-
ness. Instead of price competition, one has a situation that is more like Schum-
peterian “technological competition.”7 (Schumpeter,1975) The rate of technologi-
cal change combined with increasing complexity (cf. below) and high cost-levels 
of R&D means that uncertainty is a major problem.  
The development of collective standards is one way to reduce uncertainty in rap-
idly changing markets. The development of a new technology with standardized 
characteristics potentially opens up a market and possibly even adjoining or 
supplementary markets for the population that supports that standard. The 
short product cycles of ICTs contribute to a situation in which it is difficult for 
single agents to dominate the markets. This raises the incentive for a greater 
variety to converge on individual standards. Granted that the (product) stan-
dard is a success on the market, “competition among suppliers of the ‘standard-
ized’ product then become increasingly based on price and service-related as-
pects of the product’s acquisition and use.” (Tassey, 2000: 592) In other words, 
the standard acts as sort of a “nonmarket selective environment” (Nelson & 
Winner, 1977) and gives the price-competition assumption of the theory an op-
portunity to work.  
LL3HUIHFW,QIRUPDWLRQ
The static allocation theory attempts to commodify the technological knowledge 
agents would need in order to produce and compete in different markets. The 
theory assumes a special ideal type of information but does not expand on its 
dimensions. This ideal type of information would have to be JHQHULF (widely ap-
plicable), FRGLILHG (in a form that is easily transferable, for example in the form 
of a manual), IUHHO\DFFHVVLEOH and FRQWH[WLQGHSHQGHQW in order for firms to even 
begin to make optimal profit maximizing choices. (K. Smith, 2000: 83) Clearly, 
the accumulation of technological knowledge is not of this order, not least in in-
formation and communication technologies. The knowledge one needs in order to 
be able to produce and compete, say in the market for semiconductors, is not a 
discrete entity of publicly-shared information which can be acquired instantane-
                                                
7 In this setting, risk-taking agents compete through an expensive search process to 
commercialize new technologies on unsaturated markets with correspondingly high 
profit-margins. Selection occurs when risk-taking entrepreneurs introduce new tech-
nologies that compete both with incumbent technologies and with other new technolo-
gies.  Here Schumpeter stresses the importance of monopoly rents to recoup R&D out-
lay. 
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ously. It is of course a complicated, costly and timely learning process to develop 
the technological and attendant capabilities. 
Standardization can be seen as an attempt to make certain elements of techno-
logical knowledge more like this ideal type of information. The standards proc-
ess is designed to codify generic types of knowledge that underlie a technology 
and to make it available to a wide set vendors and users at negligible costs. A 
standard becomes something like the stock of publicly shared knowledge as-
sumed by the production theory. This reduces information costs and reduces the 
collective risk associated with adopting new technology. Some claim that the 
economics of standards, at base, essentially a phenomenon that addresses the 
market’s inability to deal efficiently with information such that,  “the establish-
ment of standards has greatest significance when economic agents cannot as-
similate without substantial costs all the relevant information about the com-
modities that may be exchanged with other agents, and the processes by means 
of which those goods and services can be produced.” (David , 1987: see also be-
low) 
Because a bona fide standard acts to diminish uncertainty, it lowers transaction 
costs for manufacturers and other actors, increases the efficiency of information 
flows to the user and improves productivity by diminishing inefficiency associ-
ated with protracted trial and error processes in manufacturing. (David, 1995) 
Thus, standards are a key element of the “selection environment” for network 
ICT, addressing the special challenges that  ‘technological competition’ poses 
here. For economic agents, standards can produce a platform on which to move 
more easily into new product areas: in other words, it provides something of the 
flexibility assumed by the theory. For the economy, standards can avoid effi-
ciency losses due to the market’s inability to establish a standard (cf. David 
1987: 208) and it can potentially facilitate the entry of a greater number of 
agents. The question of whether the standards process does this, or whether in 
fact it excludes outsiders from participating in markets is important. 
LLLJRRGVDQGHFRQRPLFDJHQWV
The static allocation perspective also assumes a stylized type of good. Products 
are discrete substitutable stand-alone units with known characteristics. Their 
markets are unaffected by those of other goods. Their production is static and 
unit-cost may actually increase the more units that are made. (i.e. there are con-
stant or decreasing returns to scale) Many information and communications 
technologies differ substantially from this stylized type in several important 
ways. They tend to be complicated technologies involving many elements whose 
characteristics are not obvious. The soaring cost of developing new technologies 
testifies to this. Their value often depends on other products or compatible com-
ponents in the sense that a minidisk complements a minidisk player, an operat-
ing system complements a computer etc. They may be subject to increasing re-
turns to scale. (Arthur, 1989) And relatedly, the cost and value of products may 
depend on the number of others already using (installed base) and/or attached to 
the network. (network externalities) 
The existence of ‘network externalities’ opens up one of the most noted ration-
ales for formal standardization. (Katz and Saloner, 1986) There are in general 
two types of such externalities. In traditional communications networks, the 
value or a telephone increases exponentially with the number of other tele-
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phones with which it can communicate. In addition, there is the network effect 
based in ‘virtual networks’ where the value of the consumer’s technology is af-
fected by the installed base who share a common technical platform. In addition, 
many information technologies are affected by increasing returns to scale. These 
cases are typified by high initial costs (e.g. creating software) and low marginal 
costs (e.g. reproducing it on CDs).  
Formal standardization addresses the need to promote compatibility among 
components and thus reduces the cost of developing and operating complex 
technological systems8. The central idea is that, “whenever goods or services are 
complementary, their production or consumption can have positive (or negative) 
externalities, implying individual actions affect the utility of other actors.” 
(Schmidt & Werle, 1998: 74)9 The assumption is that markets are themselves 
inefficient in standardizing network technologies. A central result is that, “In-
creasing compatibility leads to rising demand so long as the increased value of 
products offsets the cost of altering them.” (Foray, 1995: 193) A second implica-
tion is that these network effects can serve to keep markets stuck in inferior 
technologies. The efficiency of the market as the ultimate selective mechanism 
stands the risk of being inefficiently slow. Alternately, there is the fear that the 
market becomes simply too reticent or indeed negligent in making choices such 
that, given a fragmented set of choices, the market does not converge on a single 
set of technologies. 10 
LY6RPHIXUWKHUREVHUYDWLRQV
The turbulence of many ICT-markets, the connectivity of these markets and 
prevailing uncertainty makes the idea of rational decisions of atomistic agents 
something of a tautology. The level of uncertainty and the need for types of coor-
dination are not reduced by the fact that ICT implies a conversion of IT and 
communication technologies with content providers too. Relatedly, there is in 
this situation considerably greater orientation towards, and interaction with, 
the demand-side than that suggested by the production theory. Further, there is 
a notable degree of vertical and horizontal interaction on the supply-side of 
ICTs, which is partly explained by the levels of uncertainty and partly by the 
complexity of the goods in some sectors. 
In general it can be said that formal standardization in a greater share of the 
economics literature begins with the idea of the ‘failure’ of such markets. 
Schmidlt & Werle (1998) indicate that the focus tends either to be on the reduc-
tion of transaction-costs, especially related to information, or on associated with 
network externalities. Drawing on these authors and others, some of the main 
economic rationales can be summed up:  
 
The economic dimensions of standards: 
                                                
8 Note the ‘two faces of compatibility’. Cf. (Werle, 2000) 
9 With reference to Tirole, 1988 and others.  
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1. Encourage market entry and enhance competition by clearly defining what is required to 
serve a market (information) 
2. ‘Standards influence the distribution of cost and benefits of building and operating large 
complex technical systems’ (Mansell, 1995: 217) 
3. Facilitate scale-economies for suppliers  
4. Allow increased and controlled variety for both users and suppliers  
5. Reduce transaction costs 
6. Standard as a public good (Berg, 1989) 
7. Standards constitute markets by defining the relevant aspects of products. (Tirole, 1988) 
8. Compatibility standards can increased value for each additional user.  
9. “Trade-off between the efficiencies arising from variety with those arising from the positive 
externalities of the uniform technical standard” (Steinmueller, 1995: 184) 
10. “Variety convey efficiencies in specialization and customization that are offset by the fail-
ure to achieve network externalities and other economies of scale.” (Steinmueller, 1995: 
185) 
 
7KHVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQSURFHVVDQGWKHLQQRYDWLRQ
SURFHVV
The economic justification—even if an enduring and adequate normative ration-
ale—is necessary but not sufficient to a full understanding of the role formal 
standards-setting plays in the innovation process. Indeed, the socio-economic 
importance of standardization is much greater than market–failure. In short, 
“the received view about standards is flawed.” (Williams, 1999: 258)  
More heterodox economic approaches, including institutional, organizational 
and evolutionary theories, may provide more insight into the standardization 
process. Given the “intricate interactions” involved in the standards process and 
its changing position, a cross-disciplinary approach seems appropriate and nec-
essary. In this section, we will review some basic elements of an innovation-
studies perspective while reviewing three relevant perspectives of the stan-
dards-setting process.  
6\VWHPVRULHQWHGLQQRYDWLRQWKHRU\
The systems-oriented innovation literature11 is in general well endowed to un-
derstand the nature of agents, institutions, knowledge and the dynamic interac-
tion between them and thus the relevance of the standards process for the inno-
vation process. The general case emphasizes the importance of complex interac-
                                                                                                                                     
10 See Greenstein & David (1990) for a typography of failures in ‘unsponsored standardi-
zation processes’.  
11 E.g. the National Systems of Innovation Approach (Lundvall, 1992), the “social sys-
tems framework” (Van de Ven, 1993), knowledge systems (David & Foray, 1995) etc. 
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tions in the economy for the innovation process. 12 They highlight on the one 
hand the importance of interaction between economic agents, (cf. Freeman 1987; 
Lundvall 1988; Van de Ven & Garud, 1989) especially between users and pro-
ducers but also involving interaction with other agents in a network. An under-
standing of such linkages is necessary in order to explain the relationships be-
tween economic agents in the ICT-area. On the other hand, the systems-oriented 
innovation literature stresses the interaction between the economic agent and 
its environment, especially the regulatory and institutional framework with 
which, and through which it interacts. One—perhaps increasingly— important 
element of the institutional framework in which ICT-firms live and breath is the 
constellation of standards development organizations.  
The basic premise for much of the systems-approaches is that firms do not pro-
duce innovations in isolation; neither in isolation from each other nor from the 
influence of the institutional framework which helps define their environment 
(and which they help define). Firms are often reliant on complementary assets 
to innovate and often rely on outside sources for significant amounts of their in-
novation. A more neoclassical view would indicate that a firm is then faced by a 
make-or-buy decision contingent on the appropriability and other dimensions of 
the inputs. And indeed, an importance source of technological knowledge and 
impulse for innovation develops between the user and the producer. (for example 
a telephone network and a switch producers) However, even in this case the re-
lationship involves collaboration in articulating and implementing the technol-
ogy (cf. sticky or tacit nature of knowledge) and not just a once-off transaction. 
In terms of inter-firm linkages, “users are a decisive link in the chain of positive 
feedbacks: the learning by using mechanism which is at the root of the dynamic 
evolution in the technology of a standard,” (Foray, 1995: 193) 
As the discussion of network-externalities would suggest, this sort of collabora-
tion is especially widespread in cases of network-technologies. In such cases, it 
may be in the best interest even between rivals to collaborate on the basic prin-
ciples of a complex technology. Such situations raise the importance of institu-
tions which help facilitate the interaction between firms and other involved par-
ties from research institutes or governments. Locii for voluntary standards-
setting is of course key. “The involvement of users, for example, is obviously very 
important for a number of reason—not least because users have a major role to 
play in the innovation process and the development of better technologies.” 
(Lundvall, 1999: 9) Standards development organizations and industrial consor-
tia can lay the basis for win-win results from collaboration, especially when 
compatibility is king and standardization in the generic technology can raise the 
possibility for customization in the specifics. 
The ‘social system framework’ of Van de Ven (1993) is one basic approach that 
illustrates the importance of the interrelationship between the ‘industrial or 
technological community’ and the ‘industrial infrastructure’. The industrial 
community includes both private firms who develop and/or use emerging tech-
nologies as well as other actors from the public and private sectors ‘who play key 
roles in the development of an industrial infrastructure of innovation’. (Van de 
Ven, 1993: 339) 
                                                
12 See Smith (2000), Innovation as a Systemic Phenomenon: Rethinking the Role of Pol-
icy. Enterprise & Innovation Management Studies, Vol 1: 73-102. 
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The Industrial infrastructure for innovation includes: 
1. Institutional arrangements legitimate, regulate and VWDQGDUGL]H a new technology, 
2. Public resource endowments of basic scientific knowledge, financing mechanisms 
and a pool of competent labor, 
3. As well as proprietary R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution functions that 
are required to develop and commercialize an innovation. (Van de Ven, 1993: 339. 
Emphasis added) 
On this basis, the argument is of a symbiotic and dynamic relationship between 
the industrial community and the infrastructure, not least standards develop-
ment organizations. It posits that, first, the innovative-capabilities of firms in an 
industry is contingent on the level of development of the industrial infrastruc-
ture. And, second, that the infrastructure emerges and develops based on the 
combined effect of the ‘actions of many public and private sector actors over an 
extended period of time.’ It should be noted that, although the relationship is 
essentially dynamic and symbiotic, the infrastructure can become an “inertial 
force” that can constrain industrial development. (Van de Ven, 1993: 353) In 
other terms, this is the danger that the  “institutional glue sets”, turning stan-
dardization into a source of rigidity for technological change. (cf. Mansell, 1995) 
It is important the institutional environment should be able to adapt at that 
juncture. 
This infrastructure, which economists commonly see as outside the system, can 
also be seen as “technological infrastructure.”(Tassey, 1991) In this view, the 
function of standardization is in effect layered in with the resources available to 
a firm, in combination with other resources: 
“the technology infrastructure consists of science, engineering and technological knowledge 
available to private industry. Such knowledge can be embodied in human, institutional or facility 
forms. More specifically, technology infrastructure includes generic technologies, 
LQIUDWHFKQRORJLHV, technical information, and research and test facilities, as well as less 
technically explicit areas including….forums for joint industry-government planning and 
collaboration…” (Tassey, 1991: 347 emphasis added) 
 
“Infratechnologies” include certain types of standards, especially compatibility 
standards. Tassey makes the link with standardization explicit (Tassey, 1995, 
2000) where he differentiates standards according to two dimensions:  
1. by their relationship to product (or service) structure 
2. by their public-good content. (from totally proprietary to totally public) 
 
The Tassey categorization is based on the effects the standard has. Primarily, a 
standard can directly involve a specific product or process, in which case it af-
fects competitive position of its sponsors. Alternately, its effects can be “non-
product” and thus not directly involve the competitive environment within the 
industry or trading-block for which it was developed. Non-product standards 
themselves become ‘infratechnologies’ such as measurement and test procedures 
and interface standards. These infratechnologies therefore become an integral 
part of the innovation process, between the firm and its environment. 
An alternate approach construes standards purely in terms of ‘information’. (cf. 
the perfect-information discussion above) rather than knowledge or a sort of 
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technology. David (1987) distinguishes the nature of the things with which the 
standard is concerned (technical reference standard, minimum admissible at-
tribute or technical design interface) from the ‘informational function performed 
by the standard in reducing transaction costs.’ As information, standards can 
specify a technical reference standard, minimum admissible attribute or techni-
cal design interface. They can facilitate communication within an industry,13 
they can reduce the cost of information acquisition for economic agents by reduc-
ing variety and they can yield uniformity which permit scale economies (‘econo-
mies of repetition’). In network technologies, standards can be seen as promoting 
technical inter-relatedness between components and promoting economies of 
scale. David (1987) 
This, however, is not a two-dimensional exercise. For the economy, it involves 
the (impossible?) situation of:  
Finding a ‘best policy flux’ , an optimized path and rate of movement across the mutable 
landscape bounded by freedom and order; between promoting forms of coordination that 
support creativity and the generation of variety in the early stages of a technology’s 
development, and promoting coordination in selection and implementation when the technology 
has matured to the extent that its capabilities of satisfying the variegated needs of users are 
understood, while attending to the spillover or externalities that such actions may have for 
interrelated areas of technological development. (David, 1995: 35) 
 
One recent approach has attempted to address the complexity from an inte-
grated approach that address the social, political and economic issues involved 
in formal standardization. The aFWRUFHQWHUHGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWDSSURDFK of 
Schmidt & Werle (1998) implies that understanding the economic rationale 
(even if possible in every case) does not in itself entail understanding formal 
standardization, neither in its process nor its effects. Accordingly, this is a cross-
disciplinary approach that tries to integrate elements from economics, political-
science and sociology to study the complex phenomenon of standardization.  
Like many of the approaches, Schmidt & Werle (1998) differentiate between 
three ‘modes of standards setting’, (i.e. by market, by firms, by regional and in-
ternational committees and corsortia). Their focus is on the last and then on “co-
ordinative”14standards. Their heuristic model of the standardization process fea-
tures three blocks with case-by-case properties:  
1. Structural aspects, involving the institutional framework, actors and technological 
foundation 
2. Process aspects, involving the decision making process 
3. Output, involving the approval dimension. 
 
The use of the Social Construction of Technology (ScoT) framework (Bijker, 
Hughes &, Pinch, 1987; Bijker, 1995) is notable in this approach. Using it, 
Schmidt & Werle approach the standardization process in terms of an ‘interac-
tion of actor-related and institutional variables with case-specific technical fac-
tors’. On the first account, actors are—far from the economic agents of the neo-
classical world— ‘composite’ agents characterized by ‘soft rationality’. The actors 
                                                
13 See Link, 1983. 
14 As opposed to ‘regulative’. See also Gaillard (1934). 
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involved in the standards writing process create a ‘constellation’ of heterogene-
ity of interests, perceptions and preferences which are not necessarily strictly in 
keeping to the economic agents (i.e. firms) they represent. The institutional 
rules of the individual standards development organizations (the rules seem to 
be surprisingly isomorphic across standards development organizations) (Werle, 
2000) constrain and can direct the ‘interpretative flexibility’ of these actors. 
In this setting, the role of standards is coordinative in the larger process of tech-
nical development: “what they coordinate is human action concerning the de-
sign, production, combination, maintenance or utilization of technical artifacts. 
Compliance with the rules promises compatibility and thus promises the arti-
facts’ smooth interoperation in a system. The rules of course are addressed to 
actors and a selection of these actors sets the rules in standardization proc-
esses.” (Schmidt & Werle, 1998: 109) 
$QHZJOREDOL]LQJVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQHQYLURQPHQW
The observation that infrastructure emerges and develops based on the com-
bined effect of the ‘actions of many public and private sector actors over an ex-
tended period of time’ and that infrastructure can become an “inertial force” that 
can constrain technological development (Van de Ven, 1993: 353) is an apt place 
to return to our point of departure: i.e. that there is emerging a new standardi-
zation environment.  
Formal standardization is clearly a phenomenon in change, and has been for 
about a decade. There are several factors of this change and several more or less 
obvious manifestations. In terms of factors, we can return to Condit (1928) and 
the observation of the enabling role of  international trade. Trade-liberalization, 
both national and international, is undoubtedly a central explanation for the 
growth of the forest of standards development organizations and undergrowth of 
consortia etc. On the one hand, the liberalization of telecom markets beginning 
in the 80s and continuing to this day, paves the way for the emergence of new 
SDOs and not least new types of standards. The replacement/upgrading of 
CEPT by ETSI in Europe in 1987/88 was an immediate result of such a process. 
Its birth was accompanied by the birth/growth of other regional SDOs in Japan 
and North America. As Werle (2000) indicates, this regional diversification re-
flected the “competitive concerns of regional companies” in a liberalizing market. 
In addition, the changing position of countries like China or of those of Eastern 
Europe affects the changing environment.  
One set of manifestations is that the, “the complexity of modern technology, es-
pecially its system character, has led to an increase in the number and variety of 
standards that affect a single industry or market.” (Tassey, 2000: 587) There are 
new methods of standardization, ‘meta-standards’ (Steinmueller, 1994), incom-
plete, anticipatory and gateway standards. In the current environment, “stan-
dardization attempts to anticipate market trends with a view to developing a 
product and working of prototypes which entails activities evermore closely 
linked to research and development.” (Foray, 1995: 211) 
In the ICT-field the proliferation of the number and variety of standards is fur-
ther mirrored in the institutional environment. Further, “the role of standards is 
changing because of the increasingly ‘configurational’ characteristics of contem-
porary ICT-systems, which opens up new choices about the internal composition 
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of a complex ICT application.” (Williams, 1999: 258) This is a deeper set of 
changes which can open greater choice but—perhaps also—greater control.  
There is an increase in number and variety of standards development organiza-
tions and other formal standardization organizations. And thus there is an in-
creasing potential for linkages and collisions. The growing demand for standards 
and standardization means, inter alia, that, “the intersection and overlapping of 
technical competences, in turn, has created struggles among different voluntary 
standards organizations in the ‘market’ for published standards. ”(David, 1995: 
30) There is indeed a challenge to coordinate the growing diversity of what are, 
in many ways, coordination-mechanisms. However, Werle (2000) indicates that 
there are processes of coordination at work in the “landscape of standardization 
organizations,” in addition to competition.  Standards development organiza-
tions have indeed tried to address this potential for conflict, partially brought on 
or at least exacerbated by technological convergence, creating liaisons. More-
over, new types of cooperative institutes like the Joint Technology Committee 
(JTC1) or the Joint Committee on Information Infrastructure Standards. On the 
axis between standards development organizations and industry consortia stan-
dards there is likewise less talk of a collision course than there was 5-10 years 
ago. Here, there are some indications of a movement towards “hybrid selection 
processes, where both market competition and negotiation play a role.” (Vercou-
len & van Wegberg, 1999: 1) 
External to the standards development organizations, but internal to the stan-
dardization environment (at least as far as governments are concerned) are chal-
lenges that involve balancing standardization with other regulatory and trade 
measures. Again the risk is that standardization, as an ‘institutional glue’ 
ceases to, “reflect the need to coordinate knowledge accumulation and the flow of 
information…” and may simply “reinforce technical designs and implementation 
choices in ways that reflect the history of past investment decisions rather than 
future opportunities associated with innovation.” (Mansell, 1995: 214-5)  
The emerging global framework draws into question the ability of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and other actors to effectively participate in stan-
dardization. Above we mentioned the importance of the linkages between user 
and producer and indicated the importance of ‘learning by doing’ effects also in 
the standards-setting process. In terms of web-based technologies, develop-
ments, for example in the IETF, (Jacobs, 2000: chap 6) have with some success 
been able to derive efficiencies in the standards process from much more open 
participation than traditional SDOs. In part this is because of the technology.15 
Notwithstanding, it indicates the possibility and the desirability of securing a 
non-exclusive set of interests in the increasingly global and increasingly expen-
sive enterprise of standardization.  
&RQFOXVLRQV
On this important note, let us round off by again stepping back 70 years when 
Gaillard (1934) identified the purpose of 'industrial standardization' as being 
essentially two-fold. According to him it establishes, "WHPSRUDU\FRQVWDQW
OHYHORIUHTXLUHPHQWV or conditions under which the practical industrial ap-
plication of DEDVLFLGHDwill be possible, WHFKQLFDOO\as well as economically; 
                                                
15 i.e. software as language, which is very much dependent on the user. cf  Foray, 1995) 
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and it coordinates factors, "whose harmonious working together is required for 
complying with the conditions determined by that temporary level of stability." 
(Gaillard, 1934: 14 emphasis added) He argued further that, "in combining the 
two functions care must be taken to leave sufficient IDFLOLW\IRUPDNLQJDVKLIW
IURPRQHWHPSRUDU\OHYHOto the next one, if and when this becomes necessary 
due to progress made in the art. " (ibid.)  
This dual-purpose— and, moreover, the need to shift between temporary 
states— goes not only for the technical standardization within the standards de-
velopment organizations but also for the institution of standardization as a 
whole. In the first sense, Gaillard introduced one of the central tensions in the 
standardization process: the delicate balance between establishing and shifting 
temporary re-configurations not only of technical and economical factors but 
others that are prerequisite to achieving temporary stability. The need for tem-
porary conditions of technical and market stability and the need for coordination 
of system-factors are two functions that are increasingly recognized as essential 
conditions of innovation in information and communications technologies. More-
over, it is important to make a shift between temporary states in order to secure 
progress.  
This same analysis could be applied to standardization and the formal stan-
dardization environment. A temporary level of conditions has been important for 
this institution to fulfill its complex purpose. As an institution, the configuration 
of standards development organizations has supplied the basis for (mostly) har-
monious collaboration of central interests. Things are changing at different lev-
els. It has therefore become important that the ICT Standardization as a whole, 
itself makes a shift to the next temporary level. There is every sign that such a 
shift is underway. The question is whether its role in innovation will be main-
tained, especially with regard to the question of inclusive participation.  
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Eric Iversen 5/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
3XOSDQGSDSHU
STEP-gruppen 6/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
%DVLFPHWDOV
STEP-gruppen 7/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
&KHPLFDOV
STEP-gruppen 8/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
%R[HVFRQWDLQHUVHWF
STEP-gruppen 9/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
0HWDOSURGXFWV
STEP-gruppen 10/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
0DFKLQHU\
STEP-gruppen 11/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
(OHFWULFDODSSDUDWXV
STEP-gruppen 12/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
,7
STEP-gruppen 13/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
7H[WLOH
STEP-gruppen 14/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\
)RRGEHYHUDJHVDQGWREDFFR
STEP-gruppen 15/95 
7KH1RUZHJLDQ1DWLRQDO,QQRYDWLRQ6\VWHP$VWXG\
RINQRZOHGJHFUHDWLRQGLVWULEXWLRQDQGXVH
Keith Smith, Espen Dietrichs and 
Svein Olav Nås 
16/95 
3RVWHQVVWLOOLQJLGHWJOREDOHLQIRUPDVMRQVVDPIXQQHW
LHWHNVSORUDWLYWVWXGLXP
Eric Iversen og Trond Einar Peder-
sen med hjelp av Erland Skogli og 
Keith Smith 
17/95 

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0nOIRUPXOHULQJL171)L0DMRUVWLG Hans C. Christensen 1/94 
%DVLVWHNQRORJLHQHVUROOHLLQQRYDVMRQVSURVHVVHQ Hans C. Christensen 2/94 
.RQNXUUDQVHG\NWLJHEHGULIWHURJNRQRPLVNWHRUL
PRWHQQ\IRUVWnHOVH
Erik S. Reinert 3/94 
)RUVNQLQJRPWMHQHVWH\WLQJ Johan Hauknes 4/94 
)RUVNQLQJRPWMHQHVWH\WLQJ8WIRUGULQJHUIRUNXQQ
VNDSVJUXQQODJHW
Johan Hauknes 5/94 
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,QQRYDVMRQL0UHRJ5RPVGDO Svein Olav Nås R-02-2000 
7LOEHVWHIRUGHEHVWH¥HYDOXHULQJDYRIIHQWOLJHRJLQ
GXVWULHOOHIRUVNQLQJVRJXWYLNOLQJVNRQWUDNWHU
Morten Staude, Markus Bugge og 
Trine Monsen 
R-03-2000 
61’RJEHGULIWVXWYLNOLQJ¥UROOHYLUNHPLGOHURJHIIHN
WHU
Johan Hauknes, Marianne Broch og 
Keith Smith 
R-04-2000 
61’RJGLVWULNWVXWYLNOLQJ¥UROOHYLUNHPLGOHURJUH
VXOWDWHU
Lillian Hatling, Sverre Herstad og 
Arne Isaksen 
R-05-2000 
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(FRQRPLFDFWLYLW\DQGWKHNQRZOHGJHLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLQ
WKH2VORUHJLRQ
Heidi Wiig Aslesen, Thor Egil Braad-
land, Keith Smith and Finn Ørstavik  
R-01-1999 
5HJLRQDOHLQQRYDVMRQVV\VWHPHU,QQRYDVMRQRJOULQJ
LUHJLRQDOHQULQJVPLOMHU
Arne Isaksen (red.) R-02-1999 
8WYLNOLQJRJIRUQ\HOVHL1+2VPHGOHPVEHGULIWHU
’HO$$QDO\VHGHO
Eric J. Iversen, Svein Olav Nås, Nils 
Henrik Solum, Morten Staude 
R-03-1999 (A) 
8WYLNOLQJRJIRUQ\HOVHL1+2VPHGOHPVEHGULIWHU
’HO%7DEHOOWLOOHJJ
Eric J. Iversen, Svein Olav Nås, Nils 
Henrik Solum, Morten Staude 
R-03-1999 (B) 
,QQRYDWLRQNQRZOHGJHEDVHVDQGFOXVWHULQJLQVH
OHFWHGLQGXVWULHVLQWKH2VORUHJLRQ
Heidi Wiig Aslesen, Thor Egil Braad-
land, Louise Hvid Jensen, Arne 
Isaksen and Finn Ørstavik 
R-04-1999 
3HUIRUPDQFHDQGFRRSHUDWLRQLQWKH2VORUHJLRQ
EXVLQHVVVHFWRU
Heidi Wiig Aslesen, Thor Egil Braad-
land, Anders Ekeland and Finn 
Ørstavik 
R-05-1999 
7KHFKDQJLQJUROHRISDWHQWVDQGSXEOLVKLQJLQEDVLF
DQGDSSOLHGPRGHVRIRUJDQLVHGUHVHDUFK
Eric J. Iversen and Aris Kaloudis R-06-1999 
*RYHUQDQFHDQGWKHLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPRIWKHILVK
SURFHVVLQJLQGXVWU\LQ1RUWKHUQ1RUZD\
Heidi Wiig Aslesen R-07-1999 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQLQ
QRYDWLRQDQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHGVHUYLFHV
Johan Hauknes and Lennart 
Nordgren 
R-08-1999 
7HFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVDQGLQQRYDWLRQSROLFLHV Johan Hauknes R-09-1999 

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5HJLRQDOLVDWLRQDQGUHJLRQDOFOXVWHUVDVGHYHORSPHQW
VWUDWHJLHVLQDJOREDOHFRQRP\
Arne Isaksen R-01-1998 
,QQRYDWLRQLQXOWUDSHULSKHUDOUHJLRQV7KHFDVHRI
)LQQPDUNDQGUXUDODUHDVLQ1RUZD\
Heidi Wiig and Arne Isaksen R-02-1998 
&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFHDQGWKH,QQRYDWLYH(FRQRP\
3ROLF\LPSOLFDWLRQV
William Lazonick and Mary 
O’Sullivan 
R-03-1998 
6WUDWHJLFWHFKQRORJ\DOOLDQFHVE\(XURSHDQILUPV
VLQFHTXHVWLRQLQJLQWHJUDWLRQ"
Rajneesh Narula R-04-1998 
,QQRYDWLRQWKURXJKVWUDWHJLFDOOLDQFHVPRYLQJWR
ZDUGVLQWHUQDWLRQDOSDUWQHUVKLSVDQGFRQWUDFWXDO
DJUHHPHQWV
Rajneesh Narula and John Hage-
doorn 
R-05-1998 
)RUPDOFRPSHWHQFLHVLQWKHLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPVRIWKH
1RUGLFFRXQWULHV$QDQDO\VLVEDVHGRQUHJLVWHUGDWD
Svein Olav Nås et al. R-06-1998 
,QWHUQDVMRQDOWHUIDULQJVJUXQQODJIRUWHNQRORJLRJ
LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNUHOHYDQWHLPSOLNDVMRQHUIRU1RUJH
Svend-Otto Remøe og Thor Egil 
Braadland 
R-07-1998 
,QQRYDVMRQL1RUJH(QVWDWXVUDSSRUW Svein Olav Nås R-08-1998 
,QQRYDWLRQUHJLPHVDQGWUDMHFWRULHVLQJRRGVWUDQVSRUW Finn Ørstavik R-09-1998 
6WUXNWXURJG\QDPLNNLNXQQVNDSVEDVHUWHQULQJHUL
2VOR
H. Wiig Aslesen, T. Grytli, A. Isak-
sen, B. Jordfald, O. Langeland og O. 
R. Spilling  
R-10-1998 
*UXQQIRUVNQLQJRJNRQRPLVNYHNVW,NNH
LQVWUXPHQWHOONXQQVNDS
Johan Hauknes R-11-1998 
’\QDPLFLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPV’RVHUYLFHVKDYHDUROH
WRSOD\"
Johan Hauknes R-12-1998 
6HUYLFHVLQ,QQRYDWLRQ¥,QQRYDWLRQLQ6HUYLFHV Johan Hauknes R-13-1998 
,QIRUPDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQWHFKQRORJ\LQLQWHU
QDWLRQDOSROLF\GLVFXVVLRQV
Eric Iversen, Keith Smith and Finn 
Ørstavik  
R-14-1998 
II 
STEP 
Studier i teknologi, innovasjon og økonomisk politikk 
Norwegian Input-Output Clusters and Innovation Pat-
terns 
Johan Hauknes  R-15-1998 

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,QQRYDWLRQILUPSURILWDELOLW\DQGJURZWK Svein Olav Nås and Ari Leppãlahti  01/97 
,QQRYDWLRQSROLFLHVIRU60(VLQ1RUZD\$QDO\WLFDO
IUDPHZRUNDQGSROLF\RSWLRQV
Arne Isaksen and Keith Smith  02/97 
5HJLRQDOLQQRYDVMRQ(QQ\VWUDWHJLLWLOWDNVDUEHLGRJ
UHJLRQDOSROLWLNN
Arne Isaksen  03/97 
,QQRYDWLRQ$FWLYLWLHVLQ3XOS3DSHUDQG3DSHU3URGXFWV
LQ(XURSH
Errko Autio, Espen Dietrichs, Karl 
Führer and Keith Smith  
04/97 
,QQRYDWLRQ([SHQGLWXUHVLQ(XURSHDQ,QGXVWU\ Rinaldo Evangelista, Tore Sandven, 
Georgio Sirilli and Keith Smith  
05/97 
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1\VNDSQLQJRJWHNQRORJLXWYLNOLQJL1RUG1RUJH(YDOX
HULQJDY17SURJUDPPHW
Arne Isaksen m. fl.  01/96 
1\VNDSQLQJRJWHNQRORJLXWYLNOLQJL1RUG1RUJH(YDOX
HULQJDY17SURJUDPPHW
Arne Isaksen m. fl.  01/96 - kort 
+RZLQQRYDWLYHLV1RUZHJLDQLQGXVWU\"$QLQWHUQD
WLRQDOFRPSDULVRQ
Svein Olav Nås  02/96  
/RFDWLRQDQGLQQRYDWLRQ*HRJUDSKLFDOYDULDWLRQVLQ
LQQRYDWLYHDFWLYLW\LQ1RUZHJLDQPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXV
WU\
Arne Isaksen  03/96  
7\SRORJLHVRILQQRYDWLRQLQVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQ
WHUSULVHVLQ1RUZD\
Tore Sandven 04/96 
,QQRYDWLRQRXWSXWVLQWKH1RUZHJLDQHFRQRP\+RZLQ
QRYDWLYHDUHVPDOOILUPVDQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHV
LQ1RUZD\
Tore Sandven 05/96  
6HUYLFHVLQ(XURSHDQ,QQRYDWLRQ6\VWHPV$UHYLHZRI
LVVXHV
Johan Hauknes and Ian Miles  06/96 
,QQRYDWLRQLQWKH6HUYLFH(FRQRP\ Johan Hauknes 07/96  
(QGULQJLWHOHNRPPXQLNDVMRQXWIRUGULQJHUIRU1RUJH Terje Nord og Trond Einar Pedersen  08/96 
$QHPSLULFDOVWXG\RIWKHLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPLQ)LQPDUN Heidi Wiig  09/96  
7HFKQRORJ\DFTXLVLWLRQE\60(
VLQ1RUZD\ Tore Sandven 10/96 
,QQRYDWLRQ3ROLFLHVIRU60(VLQ1RUZD\ Mette Christiansen, Kim Møller Jør-
gensen and Keith Smith  
11/96 
’HVLJQDQG,QQRYDWLRQLQ1RUZHJLDQ,QGXVWU\ Eva Næss Karlsen, Keith Smith and 
Nils Henrik Solum  
12/96 
/RFDWLRQDJJORPHUDWLRQDQGLQQRYDWLRQ7RZDUGVUH
JLRQDOLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPVLQ1RUZD\"
Bjørn T. Asheim and Arne Isaksen  13/96 
6XVWDLQHG(FRQRPLF’HYHORSPHQW William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan 14/96 
3RVWHQVVWLOOLQJLGHWJOREDOHLQIRUPDVMRQVDPIXQQHWHW
HNVSORUDWLYWVWXGLXP
Eric Iversen og Trond Einar Pedersen  15/96 
5HJLRQDO&OXVWHUVDQG&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVWKH1RUZHJLDQ
&DVH
Arne Isaksen  16/96 

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:KDWFRPSULVHVDUHJLRQDOLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHP"$QHP
SLULFDOVWXG\
Heidi Wiig and Michelle Wood  01/95  
$GRSWLQJD
KLJKWHFK
SROLF\LQD
ORZWHFK
LQGXVWU\
7KHFDVHRIDTXDFXOWXUH
Espen Dietrichs  02/95  
,QGXVWULDO’LVWULFWVDV
OHDUQLQJUHJLRQV
$FRQGLWLRQIR
SURVSHULW\
Bjørn Asheim  03/95  

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 
1HZGLUHFWLRQVLQUHVHDUFKDQGWHFKQRORJ\SROLF\,GHQWL
I\LQJWKHNH\LVVXHV
Keith Smith  01/94  
)R8LQRUVNQULQJVOLY Svein Olav Nås og Vemund Riiser  02/94  
&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVDQGLWVSUHGHFHVVRUVD\HDUFURVV
QDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH
Erik S. Reinert  03/94  
,QQRYDVMRQRJQ\WHNQRORJLLQRUVNLQGXVWUL(QRYHUVLNW Svein Olav Nås, Tore Sandven og 
Keith Smith  
04/94  
0RWHQUHJLRQDOLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNIRU1RUJH Arne Isaksen  04/95  
)RUVNHUPRELOLWHWLQULQJVOLYHWL Anders Ekeland  05/94 
 STEP 
Studier i teknologi, innovasjon og økonomisk politikk 
III
1DWXUYLWHUQHVNRQWDNWPHGDQGUHVHNWRUHULVDPIXQQHW Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland  06/94  
)RUVNQLQJVRJWHNQRORJLVDPDUEHLGLQRUVNLQGXVWUL Svein Olav Nås  07/94  
)RUVNHUPRELOLWHWLLQVWLWXWWVHNWRUHQL Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland  08/94  
0RGHOOLQJWKHPRELOLW\RIUHVHDUFKHUV Johan Hauknes 09/94  
,QWHUDFWLRQVLQNQRZOHGJHV\VWHPV)RXQGDWLRQVSROLF\
LPSOLFDWLRQVDQGHPSLULFDOPHWKRGV
Keith Smith  10/94 
7MHQHVWHVHNWRUHQLGHWNRQRPLVNHKHOKHWVELOGHW Erik S. Reinert  11/94 
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQHFRQRPLFWKHRU\LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUGH
YHORSPHQWJHRJUDSK\
Erik S. Reinert and Vemund Riiser  12/94  
7MHQHVWH\WHQGHQULQJHUNRQRPLRJWHNQRORJL Johan Hauknes 13/94  
7HNQRORJLSROLWLNNLGHWQRUVNHVWDWVEXGVMHWWHW Johan Hauknes 14/94  
$6FKXPSHWHULDQWKHRU\RIXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWDFRQ
WUDGLFWLRQLQWHUPV"
Erik S. Reinert  15/94  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ5	’SHUIRUPDQFH$QRWHRQDQHZ
2(&’LQGLFDWRU
Tore Sandven 16/94  
1RUVNILVNHULWHNQRORJLSROLWLVNHPnOLPWHPHGUHJLR
QDOHNXOWXUHU
Olav Wicken  17/94  
5HJLRQDOHLQQRYDVMRQVV\VWHP7HNQRORJLSROLWLNNVRPUH
JLRQDOSROLWLNN
Bjørn Asheim  18/94  
+YRUIRUHUNRQRPLVNYHNVWJHRJUDILVNXMHYQWIRUGHOW" Erik S. Reinert  19/94  
&UHDWLQJDQGH[WUDFWLQJYDOXH&RUSRUDWHLQYHVWPHQW
EHKDYLRXUDQGHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH
William Lazonick  20/94  
(QWUHSUHQUVNDSL0UHRJ5RPVGDO(WKLVWRULVNSHUV
SHNWLY
Olav Wicken  21/94 
Fiskerinæringens teknologi og dens regionale forank-
ring 
Espen Dietrichs og Keith Smith  22/94  
6NLOOIRUPDWLRQLQZHDOWK\QDWLRQV2UJDQL]DWLRQDOHYR
OXWLRQDQGHFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHV
William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan 23/94 
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EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUHPHGIRUVNQLQJNQ\WWHWWLODOOH
VLGHUYHGLQQRYDVMRQRJWHNQRORJLVNHQGULQJPHG
V UOLJYHNWSnIRUKROGHWPHOORPLQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVNYHNVWRJGHVDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU%DVLVIRUJUXSSHQVDUEHLGHU
HUNMHQQHOVHQDYDWXWYLNOLQJHQLQQHQYLWHQVNDSRJ
WHNQRORJLHUIXQGDPHQWDOIRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnUOLNHYHOPDQJHXO¡VWHSUREOHPHURPNULQJ
KYRUGDQSURVHVVHQPHGYLWHQVNDSHOLJRJ
WHNQRORJLVNHQGULQJIRUO¡SHURJKYRUGDQGHQQH
SURVHVVHQInUVDPIXQQVPHVVLJHRJ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJVWHNQRORJLRJLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQL67(3JUXSSHQHUGHUIRUVHQWUHUW
RPNULQJKLVWRULVNH¡NRQRPLVNHVRVLRORJLVNHRJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNHVS¡UVPnOVRPHUUHOHYDQWHIRUGH
EUHGHIHOWHQHLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNRJ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW

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LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLVRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQLQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\DQGLQQRYDWLRQDUHIXQGDPHQWDOWR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\KDYHVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFLPSDFWV5HVROYLQJ
VXFKSUREOHPVLVFHQWUDOWRWKHIRUPDWLRQDQG
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LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK 
 
